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ABSTRACT. Epistemic paternalism is the thesis that in some circumstances we are 
justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for their own epistemic good 
without consulting them on the issue. In this paper, I address the issue of who is 
rationally entitled to undertake paternalistic interferences, and in virtue of which 
features one has this entitlement. First, I undermine the view according to which 
experts are the most apt people to act as paternalist interferers. Then, I argue that 
epistemic authorities are in a better position to satisfy the requirements of justified 
epistemic paternalism, when conceived according to the service model of epistemic 
authority. Finally, I offer a virtue-based account of paternalist interferers and show 
how it can apply to cases in which the interferer is a group or an institution. 
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§1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Suppose a mother enrols her son in university and pays for the tuition fees while he is 
working to save money and is unsure whether to keep studying. Almost everyone would 
agree that she is acting paternalistically towards him. Some would argue that her 
interference is permissible; others would disagree. In this paper, I am interested in the 
specific phenomenon epistemologists call epistemic paternalism, according to which in some 
circumstances we are justified in interfering with the inquiry of another for their own 
epistemic good without consulting them on the issue (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013, 4). For now, let 
us consider the example above as a case of an epistemically paternalistic interference. Other 
examples may include a judge withholding information from the jurors about the track 
record of crimes committed by the defendant in order to preclude them from developing a 
bias against him; and a health department mandating the introduction of prediction models 
for medical diagnosis and prognosis in order to prevent clinicians from overestimating their 
expertise and clinical abilities. 
Epistemic paternalism (henceforth, EP) is commonly regarded as a harmful epistemic 
practice that could undermine our freedom, epistemic autonomy, or both. However, in the 
last three decades, a few epistemologists have endorsed the view that there are both 
genuinely defensible forms of EP and epistemic goods that paternalistic interferences could 
allow the subjects interfered with to gain (see §2, Ahlstrom-Vij 2013; Bullock 2016; Goldman 
1991; and Pritchard 2013). Surprisingly enough, not much work has been done on the 
question of who is rationally entitled to undertake paternalistic practices, and in virtue of 
which features one has this entitlement. 
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I aim to provide a compelling answer to this question. In particular, I will challenge 
Goldman’s view, according to which one’s paternalistic interference is justified insofar as the 
interfering subject is an expert. I shall argue that the epistemic conditions for being a 
paternalist interferer substantially differ from the requirements of cognitive expertise (§3). 
Specifically, they differ in a way that makes Goldman’s own definition of an expert 
inadequate to justify epistemically paternalistic interferences, as paternalist interferers have 
a different task to accomplish from experts and therefore are required to display a different 
set of intellectual virtues. I shall also argue that epistemic authorities—which I take to differ 
from experts in a relevant sense (§4)—cannot fulfil the function of paternalist interferers. 
Yet I will show that experts and epistemic authorities have some relevant features in 
common. In §5, I will offer what I consider a compelling account of virtuous paternalist 
interferers, while in §6 I shall defend the idea that my account can apply to cases in which 
paternalist interferers are collectives, such as groups or institutions. 
My argumentative strategy is grounded in a virtue-based framework, which—as I have 
argued elsewhere (see Croce 2017)—provides an extremely effective tool for distinguishing 
various ways in which a subject can be epistemically superior to another. For this reason, 
this paper contributes to showing how virtue theory contributes to the current 
epistemological research by providing insights into an underexplored topic in social 
epistemology. Some might feel disappointed about the scope of the project in that it does 
not purport to provide a conclusive straightforward answer to whether EP, in general, is an 
epistemically justified practice. That remains a fair question, one still open for debate. 
Research on epistemic paternalism could nonetheless benefit from the results of this project. 
Were my argument to be compelling, it would provide an effective corrective to a potentially 
wrong research line according to which only experts should be granted the entitlement to 
paternalistically interfere with someone’s inquiry. It would also allow us to identify another 
type of authoritative subject in the epistemic realm, one that should not be confused with 
cognitive experts and epistemic authorities. 
 
 
§2 EPISTEMIC PATERNALISM IN A NUTSHELL 
 
In Alvin Goldman’s early formulation (1991, 118–19), epistemic paternalism has two 
fundamental features. First, it is a form of protection that a subject (or a group) A, who is 
more reliable than a subject (or a group) B, exerts on B to improve the effectiveness of their 
epistemic agency, either by putting B in the conditions to acquire an epistemic good or by 
preventing B from developing various forms of epistemic deficiencies (e.g., cognitive biases, 
unjustified beliefs, or inappropriate heuristic reasoning). Second, EP involves A’s 
interposition with B’s agency to the extent that B lacks the opportunity to exercise their 
own judgment in the way they think to be most appropriate. 
Both components of Goldman’s view of EP are featured in Ahlstrom-Vij’s recent 
account (2013), according to which A undertakes an epistemically paternalistic practice 
towards B by doing (or omitting to do) X if and only if the following conditions are met: 
 
(a) Doing X interferes with the epistemic autonomy or freedom of B to conduct inquiry 
in whatever way they see fit (interference condition); 
(b) A does so without consulting B on whether B should be interfered with in the 
relevant manner (non-consultation condition); and 
(c) A does so for the purpose of making B epistemically better off (improvement 
condition). 
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Let us consider in detail these three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an 
interference to be epistemically paternalistic. The interference condition captures Goldman’s 
point on A’s interposition with B’s agency. Assuming an involuntaristic framework, 
according to which we cannot believe things on command, interfering with one’s epistemic 
agency, particularly with one’s inquiry,1 amounts to compromising one’s freedom to choose 
the most appropriate methods and strategies to perform some epistemic task and thus to 
attain an epistemic good. The jurors case mentioned above amounts to an example of an 
external constraint on information access in which jurors’ freedom to evaluate the case is 
compromised by the fact that the judge withholds relevant information in order to prevent 
them from becoming biased against the defendant. The prediction-model case features a 
constraint on information collection because it forces clinicians to collect some, and not 
other, information about patients and to ground their diagnosis on the results provided by 
the model. The mother case is an example of a slightly different sort of interference, in that 
her intervention affects her son’s freedom to decide how to deal with his academic and 
professional interests by making things easier for him to opt for studying.2 
According to the non-consultation condition, for an interference to be (epistemically) 
paternalistic, A does not ask B whether B is happy with A’s interference. On Ahlstrom-Vij’s 
account, for the interference to be paternalistic it is not necessary that B would object to 
A’s interference, had they been consulted, nor that B would not welcome the interference 
itself. What matters instead is that A act irrespectively of what B might think about the 
interference—that is, that A does not ask for B’s opinion, or, in case A knows it, disregards 
what B wants.3 
The improvement condition captures Goldman’s point on protection, yet it goes beyond 
that concept, for it explains that the scope of A’s interference is not merely that of protecting 
B from a potential epistemic harm. Rather, it aims at ensuring that B’s epistemic agency 
benefits from the interference. One plausible way to account for how a paternalistic 
interference can make one epistemically better off is to refer to the notion of epistemic value 
as conceived by Pritchard (2009, 2013), amongst others. His take on epistemic paternalism 
sheds light on a relevant weakness of Goldman’s and Ahlstrom-Vij’s perspectives, which 
measure the epistemic benefits and harms of a paternalistic interference in a purely veritistic 
way—that is, by considering the number of true beliefs that A allows B to acquire, or the 
number of false beliefs that A prevents B from acquiring (see 2013, 4). On a broader 
perspective, it sounds reasonable to concede that A’s interference can make B epistemically 
better off in at least two more ways. First, B might improve their understanding of some 
subject matter x or avoid worsening their understanding of x as a result of A’s interference. 
Second, B might acquire intellectual virtues or avoid forming epistemic vices because of A’s 
interference. Notice that the improvement condition constrains A’s purpose, rather than the 
outcome of A’s interference. Thus, as Ahlstrom-Vij points out, for an interference to count 
as epistemically paternalistic it is not necessary that A promote B’s well-being: A’s failure 
in improving B’s epistemic well-being might make the interference unjustified, but it does 
not affect its status as an epistemically paternalistic practice (2013, 49). 
                                               
1 On Ahlstrom-Vij’s view, inquiry cannot be reduced to belief formation; rather, it is something the subject does 
and whose purposes, methods, and activities “are selected specifically on account of their epistemic merits, that 
is, because of how they (as far as we can tell) tend to lead us towards true belief and away from false beliefs” 
(2013, 40). 
2 For further considerations on different kinds of constraints, see Bullock (2016, 2–3). 
3 Ryan (2016) makes a similar point about general paternalism when he suggests that Dworkin’s condition 
(2010)—according to which A’s interference is paternalistic insofar as A acts without the consent of B—be 
replaced with the requirement that A acts irrespective of the consent of B. 
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If we take a quick look at the debate on general paternalism, it is easy to notice that 
all three requirements for epistemic paternalism might be questioned. Ryan (2016) would 
presumably reject the non-interference condition, as he contends that “an action may be 
paternalistic without interfering in the liberty or autonomy of the object of the paternalist 
action” (126). Feinberg (1986) might reject the non-consultation condition since he believes 
that a coercive rule legislated for someone’s sake and approved by the subjects interfered 
with is not paternalistic (20). And Dworkin (2017) would replace the improvement condition 
with a success-based condition, according to which A’s interference shall improve B’s welfare 
or promote B’s interest, values, or good. In what follows, I assume that Ahlstrom-Vij’s 
conditions can nonetheless be defended; I shall leave a more detailed discussion of these 
requirements for another time. 
All I have said so far concerns the requirements for one’s interference with another’s 
agency to count as epistemically paternalistic. However, for an epistemically paternalistic 
interference to be justified, some story has to be told about how the interference comes to 
have the relevant beneficial effects it is meant to generate. That is a very complicated matter 
because it has to be shown not only that (i) an epistemically paternalistic interference is 
likely to promote the interfered-with subjects’ epistemic good, but also that (ii) it does not 
damage their overall welfare. The former requirement amounts to demonstrating that A 
must have a justified belief that their interference is likely to be beneficial for B. To account 
for this requirement, Ahlstrom-Vij introduces the burden-of-proof condition, which demands 
that “the would-be interferers are able to make a case that available evidence suggests that 
it is highly likely that everyone does or will benefit from the relevant form of interference, 
compared to relevant alternatives” (2013, 122). The latter requirement amounts to showing 
that the epistemic reasons for interfering do not clash with other relevant epistemic or non-
epistemic reasons against intervention. 
For the sake of argument, let us grant that (i) is fairly unproblematic, and focus on (ii). 
The first problem with this requirement is that any interference seems to violate at least 
the interfered-with subject’s own autonomy or personal sovereignty. Some would presumably 
argue that such a violation might constitute a sufficient reason not to undertake any form 
of epistemically paternalistic interference. Yet there are ways to resist this objection. 
According to Bullock, the proponent of EP might respond that personal sovereignty is only 
pro tanto valuable, as there might well be circumstances in which our reasons for interfering 
outweigh the concern for one’s autonomy (2016, 10). According to Pritchard (2013), EP 
need not clash with this legitimate concern, because a small violation of someone’s autonomy 
today might be justified by the fact that it leads to improving their freedom and autonomy 
in the longer term. 
The second problem with (ii) pertains to finding a compelling way to cash out this 
requirement. Ahlstrom-Vij’s strategy amounts to introducing the alignment condition, 
according to which in order for an epistemically paternalistic interference to be justified, A’s 
epistemic reasons for the interference need to be aligned with A’s non-epistemic reasons for 
the interference by either constituting additional reasons for interfering or by being silent 
on the issue—that is, by not constituting reasons against interfering (2013, 117). This 
condition does not require—as rival options do4—that A knows the weight of the reasons to 
be balanced, but only their valence (their direction for or against a given interference). 
However, it presents a relevant weakness: as Ahlstrom-Vij admits, it does not constitute a 
stable necessary condition for justified epistemic paternalism, because there may be cases in 
                                               
4 See, e.g., Bullock’s balancing-goods condition (2016, 8). 
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which a weak non-epistemic reason against interfering fails to outweigh robust epistemic 
reasons for intervention.5 
Despite these problems, Ahlstrom-Vij holds that the burden-of-proof condition and the 
alignment condition are jointly sufficient to justify epistemically paternalistic practices 
(114). It is important to notice that his justification of EP targets large-scale situations in 
which someone’s interference is going to have an impact on a considerable number of 
subjects. This explains why in his view the notion of evidence on the likelihood of an 
interference’s beneficial effects is to be conceived in terms of statistical probability. 
Nonetheless, it seems possible to justify paternalistic interferences even in the absence of 
such statistical evidence, or so I shall contend. In several ordinary circumstances, some 
interferences can help particular subjects (or groups) in virtue of their specific epistemic 
situation. Think, for example, of a parent hiding a joke history book, i.e. a book including 
unreliable information and jokes about historical events, from their kids (Pritchard 2013, 
15); of a doctor breaking her patient’s right not to know about his illness (Bullock 2016, 3), 
as she justifiedly believes he will benefit from knowing that he is out of danger; or of a 
teacher refraining from providing a student with the tools to solve a geometry problem in 
order to let her develop analytical skills. What matters in circumstances like these is that 
the interferer be an epistemically competent subject who has the ability to form justified 
beliefs about the benefits of the relevant form of interference as well as about why that 
course of action is meant to be more beneficial than relevant alternatives. 
In this picture, Ahlstrom-Vij’s burden-of-proof condition becomes a special instance of 
a more general requirement—call it the epistemic-reasons condition—according to which 
interferers must have robust epistemic reasons for believing that the subject(s) interfered 
with will benefit from the intervention, compared to relevant alternatives. Those who fulfil 
the burden-of-proof condition are by definition satisfying the epistemic-reasons condition 
too, yet in several cases someone can fulfil the latter without being in a position to satisfy 
the former. In such circumstances, an interference is justified insofar as it fulfils the 
epistemic-reasons condition and the alignment condition. I shall argue that for a paternalist 
interferer to be justified in intervening in someone else’s inquiry as required by these 
conditions, they need to be virtuous interferers (see §5). 
 
 
§3 JUSTIFYING EP: AGAINST THE EXPERTISE STRATEGY 
 
In several passages of his work on EP, Goldman suggests that expertise is a fundamental 
component for defending epistemic paternalism and argues that “to justify any particular 
instance of such paternalism … we must have grounds for taking the agent to be an expert” 
(1991, 128). This claim seems to suggest that in his view, expertise should be considered a 
necessary condition for one to be entitled to undertake epistemically paternalistic 
interferences towards another. However, if someone thinks that, by definition, experts fulfil 
the justification conditions of paternalistic interferences, cognitive expertise would become 
a sufficient requirement for justified EP. After introducing Goldman’s account of a cognitive 
expert,6 I shall argue that his notion of expertise is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
justifying epistemically paternalistic interferences. 
                                               
5 See also Bullock (2016, 9–10) on this point. 
6 Henceforth I will refer to cognitive experts simply as “experts”. What Goldman means by the notion of cognitive 
or intellectual expertise is the expertise pertaining to an agent’s propositional knowledge and understanding, 
whereas practical or performative expertise identifies the expertise pertaining to an agent’s “competence at 
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Goldman has recently remarked that any definition of an expert should reflect their 
function within an epistemic community. Specifically, he contends that such definition 
should explain “what expertise is by reference to what experts can do for laypersons by 
means of their special knowledge or skill” (2016, 1). Thus, any account of expertise should 
not only provide a definition of an expert (definition requirement) but also explain how this 
definition fits the function of expertise assumed by its proponent (function requirement). 
The definition of an expert on Goldman’s 1991 account can be summarized as follows: 
 
EXPERT. A subject S is an expert in a domain D iff  
[T-LC]    S has true answers to core questions in D; or 
[AC]      S has the capacity to acquire true answers to core questions arising in D. 
 
The former requirement is a truth-linked condition highlighting the veritistic flavour of 
Goldman’s definition, in that it measures expertise based on the number of true beliefs an 
expert possesses about the main issues in D. The latter is an ability condition that allows us 
to also consider experts those who have the ability to solve new problems arising within D, 
no matter whether they actually have done so. Thus, in this account, experts are supposed 
to perform what I call a research-oriented function, according to which S is an expert in 
domain D iff 
 
[R-OF]  S has the capacity to contribute to the epistemic progress of D. S can provide 
such help by offering true answers to the questions under dispute in D. 
 
Now, let us go back to the conditions for justified EP in light of this account of an expert. 
Someone, if not Goldman himself, might want to hold the view that experts satisfy the 
burden-of-proof condition. It could be argued that a subject A, in virtue of their expertise, 
is the best candidate to evaluate available evidence in D and make a case that their 
interference with B is highly likely to make B epistemically better off. In fact, it is plausible 
to contend that experts know much better than laypeople how to assess pros and cons of a 
given course of action in their domain of expertise in light of relevant alternative practices. 
Similarly, one might hold that experts are also better placed to evaluate potential non-
epistemic reasons against intervention, thereby being in a position to satisfy the alignment 
condition. 
On careful analysis, though, it is far from clear that Goldman’s account of an expert 
can accommodate the requirements for justified EP. Let us focus on whether one’s expertise 
is sufficient for them to be justified in undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences. 
Consider the following example: 
 
PROF. EVERYT SOLVED. Suppose Joseph is a young mathematician based at MIT 
who is working at Hilbert’s problem n.3. Joseph knows that this specific problem 
has already been solved and knows its solution. His supervisor, Prof. Everyt Solved, 
is not only one of the most important mathematicians who worked at Hilbert’s 
problems but is also well known for her distraction and insensitivity to others’ 
epistemic needs. During a meeting with Joseph, Everyt suggests that Joseph try to 
work at problem n.3 from the beginning, as if it were still unsolved, in order to 
understand fully its structure and solution. A week later, she stops by Joseph’s 
                                               
performing a task” (Watson 2016, 2), such as playing piano, doing magic tricks, or driving a truck, and involves 
an agent’s skills and know-how. 
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desk and, once she notices he is working on the problem, she tells him straight 
away the solution to the problem without allowing him to say a word. 
 
I argue that this case satisfies the three conditions for an interference to count as 
epistemically paternalistic. Everyt’s intervention fulfils the interference condition in that she 
limits Joseph’s autonomy to conduct inquiry into Hilbert’s problem n.3 in whatever way he 
sees fit. It also fulfils the non-consultation condition because she neither takes into 
consideration Joseph’s opinion regarding her intervention nor consults him on the issue. 
Finally, it fulfils the improvement condition: due to her distraction and insensitivity to 
Joseph’s needs, Everyt forgot the advice she gave to Joseph and now she genuinely interferes 
to help him by offering the solution to the problem. I also maintain that Everyt satisfies 
Goldman’s expertise requirement: she not only has lots of true answers to the core questions 
in mathematics, but she also possesses the ability to contribute to the epistemic progress of 
the discipline, as her outstanding list of recent and forthcoming publications shows. 
Nonetheless, Everyt’s intervention does not constitute a justified case of epistemically 
paternalistic interference. Her complete insensitivity to the student’s epistemic needs 
prevents her from being in a position to satisfy the epistemic-reasons condition. As a matter 
of fact, she might possess epistemic reasons for believing that Joseph will benefit from her 
intervention and that any further non-epistemic reasons for intervening align with the 
epistemic ones. Nonetheless, the problem lies with the relevant-alternatives component, as 
she definitely fails to evaluate which attitude is going to help Joseph get the most out of his 
intellectual inquiry. A more careful evaluation would have easily allowed Everyt to 
acknowledge that the strategy of letting Joseph work at Hilbert’s problem on his own would 
have made him improve his understanding of the solution in a way that Everyt’s 
intervention obviously cannot. Yet, assessing what course of action is going to be more 
beneficial for the subject interfered with is by no means a condition for one to be an expert. 
Thus, the example shows that someone’s expertise does not ensure that their epistemically 
paternalistic interferences are justified. 
Now, let us analyse whether being an expert is nonetheless a necessary condition for 
justified EP. The fundamental problem with the above definition of an expert is that neither 
of its conditions can ensure that an expert A has good reasons to think A’s interference will 
make B epistemically better off, for they pertain to someone’s having extensive knowledge 
in a given domain. Instead, what is required for an epistemically paternalistic interference 
to be justified is that the interferer have a clear view on what is epistemically better to do 
on behalf of B. Consider the following example: 
 
VIRTUOUS COLLEAGUE. Suppose Emma and Frank are in charge of the recruiting 
process for a big company that is hiring twenty new employees. Having recently 
noticed that Frank has developed a bias against female applicants, this time Emma 
wants to help him. So she asks for Frank’s help with the first step in the selection 
process: evaluating the CVs of two hundred applicants and selecting the best forty 
profiles. But she provides him with blind CVs in order to prevent his bias from 
affecting his judgment, and she reveals the identity of the applicants only after he 
completes his task. 
 
Again, this case satisfies the three conditions of EP: it fulfils the interference condition 
because Emma prevents Frank from conducting inquiry in whatever way he sees fit; it fulfils 
the non-consultation condition since Emma does not consult Frank on the issue of whether 
he would be happy if she blinded the applicants’ CVs for him; and it fulfils the improvement 
 8 
condition, as Emma intervenes with the aim of improving his epistemic agency, namely of 
enhancing the chances that he get to know which are the most suitable profiles for the job 
positions that he needs to fill in.7 Furthermore, one might want to argue that her interference 
is justified, for the available evidence suggests it is highly likely Frank will benefit from the 
interference compared to relevant alternatives—such as letting him select candidates on the 
basis of his gender bias—and there are no relevant reasons against intervening that Emma 
should take into consideration. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the justification of Emma’s 
interference does not depend on any specific kind of expertise she might have. Rather, what 
puts her in the best position to fulfil her function as a paternalist interferer is the fact that 
she is sensitive to her colleague’s biased attitude and acquires good evidence of what is his 
best epistemic interest. 
To further stress this point, let us consider which intellectual abilities allow one to fulfil 
their function in the epistemic community. I contend that the intellectual virtues required 
for one to fulfil Goldman’s account of the expert are largely different from those that allow 
one to satisfy the justification conditions of an epistemically paternalistic interference. 
Experts need to possess what elsewhere I have called research-oriented abilities: virtues that 
allow one to exploit their fund of knowledge to find and face new problems arising in their 
field of expertise, such as intellectual curiosity, intellectual creativity, open-mindedness, 
intellectual courage, firmness, and autonomy. On the other hand, a paternalist interferer is 
virtuous insofar as they possess novice-oriented abilities: virtues that allow them to properly 
address B’s epistemic dependency on them, thereby putting them in a suitable position for 
knowing what is epistemically best to do in the service of B. This set of abilities includes 
traits such as sensitivity to B’s epistemic needs, intellectual generosity, intellectual empathy, 
sensitivity to B’s epistemic resources, practical wisdom, and maieutic ability.8 
This distinction bolsters the thesis that cognitive expertise is neither a sufficient 
requirement for one to be justified in undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences 
nor a necessary one. Being an expert is not sufficient for justifying EP, because a person’s 
expertise does not ensure that they satisfy the epistemic-reasons condition, as they may well 
lack the ability to evaluate what among several options is the most epistemically beneficial 
way to interfere with someone’s inquiry. Furthermore, being an expert is not even a 
necessary condition for justified EP, for as the case of the virtuous colleague shows, someone 
can fulfil the requirements for justified EP without being an expert. 
 
 
§4 JUSTIFYING EP: THE EPISTEMIC-AUTHORITY STRATEGY 
 
A plausible alternative to the idea that experts constitute the ideal profile of paternalist 
interferers is offered by a recent discussion on the topic of epistemic authority and, in 
particular, by the service conception of authority that Joseph Raz has proposed as a model 
of authority in the practical realm (1986) and Linda Zagzebski has recently adopted as a 
model of authority in the epistemic domain (2012). According to them, the main function 
of authorities is to serve the governed (or the novice)—that is, to do something in their 
service (see Raz 1986, 56). On my pluralistic reading of this view, an epistemic authority 
can fulfil their function in various ways, ranging from imparting true beliefs to a layperson 
B (Zagzebski 2012) and helping B weigh available evidence (Jäger 2016; Lackey 
                                               
7 Clearly, Emma’s interference would presumably have clear practical benefits, in that it could lead him to select 
better candidates. That is not in contrast with the epistemic benefit that her intervention provides, nor does it 
undermine the epistemic purpose of her actions. 
8 For further clarifications on this distinction between sets of intellectual virtues, see Croce (2017, 19–20). 
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forthcoming), to imparting understanding to B and leading B to improve their 
understanding of some subject matter on their own (Croce 2017; Jäger 2016). I suggest we 
gather these specific services under a broader formula for the function of epistemic 
authorities, which I call novice-oriented function. According to the function requirement of 
epistemic authorities, a subject A is an epistemic authority for a subject B in domain D iff 
 
[N-OF]  A has the capacity to help B achieve epistemic goals in D that B might not 
be able to achieve on their own.9 
 
The corresponding definition requirement can be introduced as follows: 
 
EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY. A subject A is an epistemic authority for a subject B in domain 
D iff 
 
[EPC]     A is better epistemically positioned than B is in D; and 
[AC*]     A possesses at least sensitivity to B’s epistemic needs. 
 
A quick comparison between this notion and that of an expert should clarify why in principle 
epistemic authorities look like a more convincing exemplar of paternalist interferers than 
experts. 
The first distinction concerns the function requirements and illustrates that these 
categories of epistemic subjects have different roles in the epistemic community. The 
function of epistemic authorities is to help the interlocutor(s) achieve epistemic goals, as 
required by N-OF. Yet they have no commitment to fulfil R-OF, which instead explains 
that the service of experts amounts to making a contribution to the epistemic progress of 
their field. This distinction has bearing on the definition requirements as well, on which the 
second difference between the two notions focuses. Instead of Goldman’s truth-linked 
condition, the definition of an epistemic authority includes the epistemic-position condition 
(EPC),10 which differs from the former in at least two relevant ways. 
On the one hand, EPC does not require that A be epistemically superior to most people 
in a domain, but rather just to their interlocutor. Thus, one can be an epistemic authority 
to another about some subject matter without being an expert on that topic. For instance, 
I might be an epistemic authority for my mother on the history of Scotland simply because 
I have some vague knowledge of the main battles and events that happened there in the 
modern era while she knows nothing about this topic, but that would not make me an expert 
in that domain. Indeed, I could not contribute to the progress of the historical research in 
this field, as required by R-OF, yet I would still provide my mom with information she lacks 
and is interested in acquiring and therefore I would fulfil N-OF. On the other hand, EPC 
does not limit one’s epistemic superiority to another to the number of true propositions or 
core answers one has in a given domain. A can, in fact, be better epistemically positioned 
than B also by having a better understanding of D, by being more intellectually virtuous 
than B, or simply by having access to more (or better) evidence. Finally, experts and 
epistemic authorities need to possess different intellectual virtues. The former should be able 
to find true answers to the questions arising in their field and therefore need to possess 
research-oriented abilities. The latter, instead, merely have to be sensitive to the 
interlocutor’s epistemic needs, thereby displaying one of the most important novice-oriented 
abilities. 
                                               
9 This definition is grounded in an alternative definition of an expert proposed by Goldman (2016, 2).  
10 More on the notion of “epistemic position” can be found in Fricker (2006). 
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Let me stress that the pluralistic account of epistemic authority introduced above 
presents two fundamental advantages over rival views:11 first, it does not restrict the kind 
of practice that A is entitled to adopt towards B to either imparting information or advising 
in a more indirect way; second, it does not restrict the epistemic good provided by A to 
either true belief or understanding. Both features are crucial to our argument, in that, first, 
they allow us to infer that this account of epistemic authority could well include 
“undertaking paternalistic interferences” as one of the viable ways A can help B achieve 
epistemic goals in D. Second, they make room for the idea that paternalistic interferences 
can benefit the interfered subject in various ways. Finally, the differences between experts 
and authorities introduced above highlight that epistemic authorities are good candidates 
as exemplars of paternalist interferers because they need to possess a fundamental 
intellectual virtue, namely the sensitivity to B’s needs, that makes A care about discovering 
what is epistemically better to do in the service of B. For these reasons, we shall consider 
whether it might be the case that epistemically paternalistic interferences are justified 
insofar as the interferer is an epistemic authority. 
 
 
§5 REFINING THE ACCOUNT: VIRTUOUS PATERNALIST INTERFERERS 
 
In this section, I will first introduce and discuss two objections to the plausible thesis that 
epistemic authorities are the ideal profile for paternalist interferers in the epistemic realm. 
I shall argue that, despite directing us on the right track, this thesis needs to be refined. 
Then, I will offer a more compelling account of paternalist interferers. 
The first problem affecting this thesis sheds light on a relevant asymmetry between the 
function requirement of epistemic authorities and the function requirement of paternalist 
interferers. The asymmetry arises in cases where an epistemically paternalistic interference 
can be beneficial to some extent yet is not grounded in A’s judgment of what is epistemically 
better to do in the service of B. Let us consider the following modified version of the 
mathematicians example introduced before: 
 
PROF. EVERYT SOLVED*. Suppose again that Joseph is working at Hilbert’s 
problem n.3. This time, he knows that the problem has already been solved, but 
he does not know the solution. Thus, he decides to work at the problem as if it 
were still unsolved in order to achieve a deep understanding of its structure. Everyt, 
his supervisor, stops by Joseph’s desk and, once she notices that he is working on 
that particular problem, reveals the solution without allowing him to say a word. 
 
This example features a case in which Everyt clearly fulfils N-OF because she has the ability 
to help Joseph achieve an epistemic good that he lacks: knowledge of the problem’s solution. 
She also displays some sort of sensitivity to the student’s needs, as she provides him with 
some useful piece of information. Nevertheless, I contend that her interference is not 
justified, because Everyt did not consider the impact of her intervention on Joseph’s inquiry 
nor has she formed any justified belief about alternative courses of action that she might 
have undertaken, as the epistemic-reasons condition requires. As a matter of fact, we expect 
a virtuous interferer at least to consider that letting Joseph work on the problem on his own 
would possibly allow him to achieve both knowledge of the solution and understanding of 
its structure at the same time with small risk, as he could look the solution up online and 
                                               
11 Compare, in particular, Croce (2017) with Lackey (forthcoming) and Zagzebski (2012). 
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get to know how Max Dehn solved this problem in 1900 by appealing to invariants of 
polyhedra. 
Thus, the fundamental asymmetry between the two function requirements at play in 
the definitions of epistemic authorities and paternalist interferers can be highlighted as 
follows. On the one hand, N-OF is neutral with respect to the epistemic goal Everyt should 
paternalistically help Joseph achieve. On the other, it is not sufficient that an interferer A 
has the ability to help B achieve some epistemic goods in D, nor that A has the ability to 
help B achieve what B aims at achieving. Paternalist interferers have a more specific service 
to fulfil: namely, they need to be able to help B achieve what is epistemically better for B in 
D. 
The second objection challenges EPC by raising the doubt that paternalist interferers 
need not be better epistemically positioned than interfered subjects to successfully provide 
their service. Consider Emma’s profile again in the case of the virtuous colleague. In the last 
section, I argued that her interference satisfies the conditions of EP introduced in §2 and 
that it could constitute a justified paternalistic interference. Nonetheless, some might argue 
that Emma is not an epistemic authority for Frank because she is not epistemically superior 
to Frank in any relevant sense with respect to the matter at issue. Indeed, both Frank and 
Emma have worked for decades in the HR department of that company, and already proved 
to be experienced recruiters. Then we should conclude that EPC is not a necessary condition 
for one to be justified in undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences, which would 
reinforce the thesis that epistemic authorities are not the ideal profile of paternalist 
interferers. 
I am not interested in resisting this conclusion, as I have already argued that the thesis 
introduced at the beginning of this section needs some refinement. However, I shall 
undermine the claim that the notion of a paternalist interferer needs no EPC. On the broad 
conception of epistemic superiority endorsed here, one can be better epistemically positioned 
than another in a very local way—for example, by lacking a relevant bias or being able to 
spot it in other people in a given circumstance. In fact, the interferer, unlike the subject 
interfered with, displays the virtue(s) of epistemic justice, which enables the former to be 
sensitive to the latter’s bias and triggers further intellectual virtues, such as the sensitivity 
to others’ needs and epistemic resources, through which they figure out how to help the 
subject interfered with. 
 These objections shed light on the fact that paternalist interferers ought to satisfy 
more stringent requirements than epistemic authorities, both for what concerns the function 
requirement and for the intellectual virtues they need to display. As for the former, this 
section has provided support for the idea that a paternalist interferer needs to be able not 
merely to provide some kind of epistemic benefit for the subjects interfered with, but rather 
to figure out what is epistemically better for them to do in given circumstances. A full 
account of a paternalist interferer’s function, though, also requires that the interferer be 
able to evaluate whether the epistemic benefits their interference is likely to generate are in 
line with further non-epistemic reasons against intervening that they might have, as required 
by the alignment condition. To clarify this point, consider the following revised version of 
Emma’s case: 
 
VICIOUS COLLEAGUE. Suppose again that Emma and Frank are in charge of 
recruiting twenty new employees for a big company, and that Emma has recently 
noticed that Frank has developed a bias against female applicants. However, she 
also knows Frank is always suspicious of other colleagues and that her move will 
raise his worries and undermine his trust in her. Nonetheless, she provides him with 
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200 blind CVs, in order to prevent his bias from affecting his judgment, and asks 
him to select the best forty profiles. 
 
In the example, Emma’s interference cannot be justified, because it clashes with the available 
evidence for what is better to do on behalf of Frank in the given circumstances. Specifically, 
she lacks a necessary concern with maintaining a relationship of mutual trust among 
colleagues—that is, a non-epistemic reason that does not align with the epistemic reasons 
supporting Emma’s interference. 
Both the function requirement and the definition requirement of a paternalist interferer 
should reflect Emma’s lack of justification. I propose the following account of virtuous 
paternalist interferers, whose function requirement maintains that a subject A is a virtuous 
paternalist interferer for a subject B in domain D iff 
 
[N-OF*] A has the capacity to help B achieve what is epistemically better for B in 
D when permitted by the balance of reasons. 
 
Thus, I put forth the following definition requirement: 
 
VIRTUOUS PATERNALIST INTERFERER. A subject A is a virtuous paternalist interferer 
for a subject B in domain D iff 
 
[EPC] A is better epistemically positioned than B is in D; 
[VC] A’s judgment about how to interfere with B’s inquiry is the product of A’s 
cognitive faculties; and 
[AC**] A deploys a wide range of novice-oriented abilities in judging how to 
intervene. 
 
As should be evident, this definition differs from the account of epistemic authority in two 
respects. First, the definition, unlike that of an epistemic authority, includes a virtue 
condition (VC), which ensures that the interferer’s decision to intervene arises out of a 
competent use of their cognitive faculties. This requirement is necessary to avoid parallel 
Gettier-style cases, where the fact that A’s interference fulfils the epistemic-reasons 
condition and the alignment condition is simply a matter of luck.12 Imagine, for example, a 
case in which a doctor breaks a patient’s right not to know the result of a medical test, 
because she has a justified belief that he will benefit from knowing that he is in good health. 
Unbeknownst to her, someone replaced the result of the test with someone else’s. As it turns 
out, the two tests had identical results. Thus, the doctor’s reasoning and judgment about 
whether to interfere with his agency would not have been different had she considered the 
correct results. Yet her beliefs about both the patient’s health situation and the best way 
to intervene are not justified, as they are true simply because of luck. A virtue condition 
allows us to ensure that a case like this does not become an example of justified EP. 
Second, the definition of a virtuous paternalist advisor includes a stronger version of 
the ability condition, which is meant to accommodate the fact that paternalist interferers 
have a different, stricter function to fulfil than epistemic authorities. Indeed, for one to be 
in a position to accomplish N-OF* it is necessary that they not only be sensitive to another’s 
epistemic needs, but also that they be able to weigh the epistemic benefit against possible 
non-epistemic reasons not to interfere—thereby displaying practical wisdom—and to make 
                                               
12 I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me. 
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sure that the subject interfered with is in a position to take advantage of the epistemic good 
they try to provide them with—thereby displaying sensitivity to their epistemic resources. 
This account allows us to explain why Emma is a virtuous paternalist interferer in the 
first example (the virtuous colleague) while she fails to satisfy the requirements in the second 
case (the vicious colleague). Specifically, in the former scenario, Emma not only fulfils EPC, 
as we have seen early on in this section, but also VC and AC**, since her judgment about 
how to help Frank is the product of her cognitive faculties and she proves herself able to 
make a virtuous use of her novice-oriented abilities by determining that the balance of 
reasons favours her intervention. For this reason, she proves herself able to accomplish N-
OF*, and therefore she can be considered a virtuous paternalist interferer. In the latter 
scenario, instead, Emma fails to fulfil both the function requirement and the definition 
requirement. As for the former, her inability to evaluate whether the epistemic reasons for 
interfering are aligned with the non-epistemic ones shows that she is unable to figure out 
what is epistemically better to do in Frank’s service. As for the latter, although her judgment 
is the product of her cognitive faculties and she is better epistemically positioned than her 
colleague because she is aware of his bias against female applicants, she does not fulfil AC**. 
For the fact that Emma has low concern for the potential harms of her interference indicates 
a failure to exercise her novice-oriented abilities in a virtuous way—particularly, practical 
wisdom as well as sensitivity to his needs and resources.13 
 
 
§6 BENEFITS OF THE ACCOUNT AND THE CHALLENGE OF INSTITUTIONAL PATERNALIST 
INTERFERERS 
 
Before concluding this inquiry into the features of paternalist interferers in the epistemic 
realm, I want to shed light on several benefits of the proposed account and address one final 
challenge. 
First, this account of a virtuous paternalist interferer settles the original worry with 
Goldman’s thesis that one can undertake epistemically paternalistic interferences insofar as 
one is an expert. I showed that his account of an expert underestimates a fundamental 
feature of paternalist interferers, namely that they need to have justified beliefs on what is 
epistemically better for the subject interfered with to do in given circumstances. Thus, 
paternalist interferers, unlike experts, need to care about the epistemic well-being of the 
subject interfered with as well as to display and appropriately exercise what I have called 
novice-oriented abilities. 
Second, the account goes beyond Goldman’s and Ahlstrom-Vij’s limited veritistic 
perspective to endorse a broader view of the epistemic well-being that includes both 
knowledge and understanding as valuable epistemic goods promoted by paternalistic 
interferences, as suggested in Pritchard (2013). 
Third, this inquiry into who can justifiedly undertake epistemically paternalistic 
interferences accounts for a special way to offer guidance in the epistemic realm and therefore 
individuates a peculiar way in which an epistemically superior subject may do something in 
the service of another. This analysis shows that the function of paternalist interferers should 
not be reduced either to that of experts or to that of epistemic authorities, as the former, 
                                               
13 A similar story could be told to explain why Everyt, in the case of Prof. Everyt Solved*, is not a virtuous 
paternalist advisor. Everyt does not fulfil N-OF*, because she fails to display the capacity to weigh the epistemic 
and the non-epistemic reasons for interfering with Joseph’s inquiry. Even though she is better epistemically 
positioned than him in the domain of Hilbert’s problems, she proves to be insensitive to his needs and resources, 
and she lacks the ability to guide him in the right direction without doing all the work on his behalf. 
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unlike the others, need to be able to balance epistemic and non-epistemic reasons for 
intervention on behalf of someone who may not be aware that another is interfering with 
their own agency. 
Despite the benefits of the proposed account of paternalist advisors, one might worry 
that this view has a very limited scope in that it only applies to one-to-one relationships 
between two epistemic subjects, one of which is better epistemically positioned and more 
intellectually virtuous than the other. However, any plausible account of epistemic 
paternalism should take into consideration cases in which groups and institutions undertake 
epistemically paternalistic interferences towards one or many epistemic subjects. That might 
be the case, for example, with a state imposing compulsory school age and with a health 
department mandating the introduction of prediction models for medical diagnosis and 
prognosis in order to prevent clinicians from overestimating their expertise and clinical 
abilities. Setting aside whether these particular interferences may or may not be justified, 
one might contend that the account I endorse cannot explain who would be a virtuous 
paternalist interferer in similar cases. 
In the rest of this section, I want to resist this claim and provide support for the thesis 
that the virtuous paternalist interferer can be extended to accommodate cases of group and 
institutional paternalist advisors. I contend that this can be the case because there are 
available ways to extend EPC and VC to groups, but more importantly because there can 
be collective and institutional virtues (see, e.g., Fricker 2010; Lahroodi 2007) and there is 
no principled reason why novice-oriented abilities cannot be part of these sets of virtues. I 
shall also admit that what follows should be considered as a first inquiry into an unexplored 
issue, rather than a conclusive argument in favour of this model of paternalist advisors in 
the epistemic domain. 
Let us quickly consider the possibility of extending EPC to groups and institutions. All 
we need to show in this regard is that it can definitely be the case that collective entities—
for example, committees, governments, or juries—are better epistemically positioned than 
other subjects in their activity as collectives and institutional structures. Indeed, the 
flourishing literature in this branch of social epistemology has already shown that groups 
intended as collectives can acquire knowledge and understanding.14 Thus, it can be argued 
that some groups are better epistemically positioned than others in a given domain by virtue 
of possessing more knowledge or better understanding. For example, it can be said that a 
scientific team conducting experimental research on the benefits and the harms of eating 
red meat is better epistemically positioned on the topic of the impact of food on human 
health than a farmers association. 
For what concerns the virtue condition and the possibility of extending it to collective 
epistemic agents, I shall limit myself to mentioning that Kallestrup has recently defended a 
collective-virtue epistemology along the lines of Sosa’s view. More will have to be said on 
these topics, but what interests us here is the possibility of arguing that a group can have 
knowledge “when the truth of its belief is a product of its innermost competence … in suitable 
shape and situation” (forthcoming, 10) provided that the group forms the appropriate joint 
intentions (12–13). From the combination of the basics of a collective-virtue epistemology 
and Kallestrup’s remark that the epistemic aims of a group may well extend beyond the 
acquisition of knowledge (15), it follows that an institution can fulfil VC, if its judgment 
about whether to interfere with someone’s inquiry for their own epistemic benefit manifests 
its innermost competence in suitable shape and situation. Thus, there are ways to prevent 
                                               
14 See, for instance, Bird (2010); Gilbert (2002, 2013); and Lackey (2012, 2014). Seminal work on the notion of 
group understanding can be found in Brady (2016), although more has yet to be said on the topic. 
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a Gettier-style case of an institution’s epistemically paternalistic intervention into someone’s 
inquiry from being justified. 
Let us now focus on how collectives can possess novice-oriented abilities. Fricker has 
proposed a twofold model for group virtues that includes both motive-based virtues and 
skill-based virtues. An example of the former is a diligent and thorough research team, 
whose members behave as follows: 
 
Its members all jointly commit to the motives of diligence and thoroughness; and 
the team lives up to those motives by proving reliable, over an appropriate span of 
time and contexts, in achieving their ends. Their research team displays irreducibly 
collective forms of diligence and thoroughness. They display these virtues as ‘a 
body’, or as one. (2010, 242) 
 
As for skill-based virtues, Fricker asks us to imagine a night-watch team of four soldiers 
who divide the labour so that each of them looks one direction and performs their task 
without any specific motive but rather just acts as they are trained to do, thereby displaying 
the virtue of vigilance as a collective skill on an excellence- or skill-based model of virtue 
(243). 
Similar considerations can be introduced about novice-oriented abilities, depending on 
whether you want to conceive them as motive-based or skill-based virtues. I shall not take 
a stand here on this point, particularly because I am inclined to think of novice-oriented 
abilities as a set that can include both kinds of virtues. Rather, it is important to highlight 
that, for example, a group of educational scientists working at a reformation of the regional 
educational policies could—and, in fact, should—as a body be sensitive to the epistemic 
resources of the youngest generations of students as well as to their epistemic needs; and 
that a group of statisticians introducing prediction models into a hospital’s clinical policies 
to increase the accuracy of clinicians’ diagnoses could—and, in fact, should—possess novice-
oriented abilities as well. 
However, going from group virtues to institutional virtues requires one more step of 
analysis, as institutions differ from groups in that they have structures and procedures but 
are not agents and possess no will. Thus, Fricker points out that institutions can possess 
and exhibit virtues only insofar as the individuals or the groups that create an institution’s 
structures and procedures are virtuous (249). This model of institutional virtues allows us 
to contend that a region, a hospital, or a state department can fulfil AC** insofar as (i) the 
group that works at building the institution’s structures and procedures displays novice-
oriented abilities as a body, and (ii) the institution’s structures and procedures encourage 
and reflect virtuous behaviour on the part of the aforementioned group. 
In conclusion, these considerations show that the three conditions of the virtuous 
paternalist interferer can apply to groups and institutions, thereby reflecting the idea that 
even a collective can be justified in undertaking epistemically paternalistic interferences 
insofar as it displays (a) appropriate competence in judging whether to interfere, (b) some 
sort of epistemic superiority to the subject interfered with, and (c) those virtues that put it 
in a position to evaluate what is epistemically better to do in their service. The project of 
extending this account of paternalist advisors in the epistemic domain to institutions should 
also take into consideration that the bigger is the number of the subjects affected by an 
institution’s interference, the more complicated will weighing epistemic and non-epistemic 
reasons for intervention be. As a matter of fact, it seems reasonable that it takes more for 
an institution interfering with the agency of hundreds or thousands of people to fulfil the 
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requirements of a virtuous paternalist advisor than it does for subjects like Everyt or Emma 
in our examples. 
 
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has explored the fairly new topic of epistemic paternalism from an original point 
of view, namely by analysing the requirements that allow one to be considered a virtuous 
paternalist interferer in the epistemic realm. After introducing the conditions for an 
interference to be epistemically paternalistic and two prominent strategies for justifying EP 
(§2), I argued against Goldman’s thesis that experts are the most appropriate candidate as 
paternalist advisors (§3). In §4, I suggested the notion of an epistemic authority—instead of 
that of an expert—as a plausible ground for an account of a paternalist interferer. As it 
turned out, the proposed view suffered from several problems, yet it allowed us to shed light 
on a fundamental feature that virtuous paternalist advisors need to exercise, namely the 
capacity to help subjects interfered with achieve what is epistemically better for them in a 
given situation. Based on this consideration, I proposed a virtue-based account of the 
paternalist interferer and showed how it accommodates common cases of epistemically 
paternalistic interferences (§5). Finally, I highlighted the benefits of the account and showed 
how it can apply to cases in which the interferer is a group or an institution (§6). 
My ultimate hope is that this paper not only contributes to studying a topic in social 
epistemology that is still in need of further work, but also that it demonstrates how virtue 
epistemology and, in particular, the study of intellectual virtues can contribute to the 
research in epistemology as a whole.15 
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